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INTRODUCTION
The Virginia mechanics' lien statutes prescribe a method whereby
laborers and materialmen, incident to new construction or improve-
ments to real estate, may perfect a lien upon the improved real estate
to the extent of the value of their goods or services which contributed
to the value of the realty. The statutes further provide a method
of enforcement in the form of a chancery suit filed in the prescribed
manner and within the prescribed time. Lastly, they accord to these
liens a priority over all others, including antecedent deeds of trust, as
to the value of the improvements, liens prior in time retaining priority
as to the value of the property before the improvements were made.
The United States Government, nominally and through its numer-
ous administrative agencies set up through the years to promote the
public weal, has thrust itself into the position of the nation's most
active creditor; as such it often finds it necessary to impose various
liens to secure its bounty. Some of these liens arise by operation of
federal law; resort is had to state law to perfect others. It is often sur-
prising in the latter case that, having reaped the benefit of the local
laws regarding the establishment of its lien, the United States takes
occasion to repudiate other local laws regarding its relative priority.
The conflict between mechanics' liens and federal financing was
recently brought into bold relief in the case of W. T. Jones and Com-
pany v. Foodco Realty, Inc.,' wherein the United States, undisclosed
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participant in a Virginia deed of trust loan, was accorded priority-un-
precedented in Virginia-over several mechanics' lienors who under
Virginia law had unquestioned priority. The result of this case and its
counterparts should give pause to lending institutions, building con-
tractors and suppliers who have become accustomed to rely upon the
time-honored statutory priority of mechanics' liens.
TiiE VIRGINIA LAW
In Virginia, laborers and materialmen are accorded a statutory
lien by section 43-3 of the Code of Virginia (1950), which provides
in part as follows:
"All persons performing labor or furnishing materials, of the
value of ten dollars or more, for the construction, removal, re-
pair or improvement of any building or structure permanently
annexed to the freehold... shall have a lien... upon such
building or structure, and so much land therewith as shall be
necessary for the convenient use and enjoyment thereof. ... "
It is further provided in section 43-4 that the lien may be per-
fected by the recordation, within sixty days from the time the work
is completed or otherwise terminated, of a memorandum of lien setting
out the particulars of the lien in detail. Enforcement of the lien may
be effected in compliance with section 43-22, which requires the filing
of a foreclosure suit in equity, in which the claimant must file an
itemized and verified statement of account.
Upon compliance with the foregoing rather exacting statutes, the
lienholder is vested with a lien prior in law to all others as to the
improvements, and inferior to those before it as to the property as it
existed before the improvements were made. Section 43-21 provides
in part:
"No lien or encumbrance upon the land created before the
work was commenced or materials furnished shall operate upon
the building or structure erected thereon, or materials furnished
for and used in the same, until the lien in favor of the person
doing the work or furnishing the materials shall have been sat-
isfied; nor shall any lien or encumbrance upon the land created
after the work was commenced or materials furnished operate
on the land, or such building or structure, until the lien in
favor of the person doing the work or furnishing the materials
shall have been satisfied...."
The priority set up by section 43-21 has been uniformly preserved
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by the Virginia courts.2 In Rust v. Indiana Flooring Co., 3 it was held
that the beneficiary under a prior recorded deed of trust is subordinat-
ed to the holders of subsequent mechanics' liens, where the deed of
trust proceeds were applied to construction, even though the deed
of trust obligee had made certain payments of the loan proceeds di-
rectly to the mechanics' lienors, and there could be no question of their
notice of this encumbrance.
This established priority has been taken for granted in Virginia
real estate transactions through the years, so much so that the ob-
taining of written mechanics' lien waivers is now a routine step in the
closing of construction loan transactions where the deed of trust is put
to record prior to the completion of construction.
EXPANSION OF FEDERAL FINANCING
We are told that there was a time when the federal government
eschewed entry into the field of consumer credit, and did content it-
self with the management and safeguarding of matters then deemed to
be of overriding national significance. However, the advent of the
great depression and various subsequent crises forced or induced the
central government to embark upon a program of financing which
is now available in some form to most citizens, and which, in a very
real and competitive sense, overhangs and profoundly affects the
market.4 The substantial increase in the scope and extent of real es-
tate development which marks this era has been stimulated in no
small measure by loan participation, either on a direct loan or a
guaranty basis, by the federal government. The government's entry
into the credit field, can, however, give rise to anomalous results by
reason of the conflict between sovereign and private interests; such
were the results obtained in Foodco case.
FACTrS OF THE FoODCO CASE
Foodco Realty Inc., was the owner of certain real estate in Camp-
bell County, Virginia, upon which it proposed to construct a large
factory and warehouse to be operated by Foodco's parent corporation,
212 Mich. Jur., Mechanics' Liens § 39 (1950): "And there is no way that a person
may lend money so that he will have priority over mechanics' liens, where the
money is to be used for the construction of a building."
'151 Va. 845, 145 S.E. 321 (1928).
'Among the administrative agencies set up to provide such financing, the Fed-
eral Housing Administration, the Veterans' Administration, the Small Business
Administration and the Farmers' Home Administration are probably the most active.
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Famous Virginia Foods Company. The construction loan was made
to Foodco by the Campbell County Bank, the bank participating,
however, only to the extent of io per cent of the loan, and the Small
Business Administration, an agency of the United States Government,
for the remaining 90 per cent. There was no public record or notice
of the federal participation. The note was made payable to the order
of the bank alone, and the deed of trust was in a form usual in Vir-
ginia, naming two private individuals as trustees, and dncorporating
by reference the provisions of sections 55-59 and 55-6c; of the Code of
Virginia (1950). Shortly after the deed of trust was recorded, construc-
tion began and the same was completed within the following year.
From time to time, in accordance with Virginia law, various laborers
and materialmen perfected mechanics' liens against the real estate
by recording the required memoranda of liens.5 Subsequently a suit
was brought in equity to subject the realty to these liens. There being
no notice of federal involvement, the United States was not made a
party to this suit. It intervened, however, and succeeded in removing
the suit to the United States District Court, where it was contended
by the government that it was entitled to full priority under the
deed of trust,6 notwithstanding the fact that under Virginia law
mechanics' liens would have priority as to the improvements.
7
The District Court, reversing a Special Master's ruling, accorded
the government priority as to the entire obligation;8 on appeal the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
decision in substance, but held that the governmental priority ex-
tended only to 90 per cent of the obligation. Thus it was held that
the United States, a silent participant in a loan transaction, gains
full priority over mechanics' lienors in contravention of the applicable
local law. In order to reach this result, the courts pursued two lines of
reasoning: the District Court's decision was based on "Federal Com-
mon Law," while the Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Federal
Priority Statute.9
5
INeither the bank nor the SBA obtained written waivers of these liens.
OSometime during the pendency of the suit the SBA obtained from the bank
an assignment of the bank's interest in the note, in consideration of SBAs promise
toL turn over to it io% of any sums realized.
7The value of the property before the improvements were made was es-
tablished at $25,ooo; in all, $156,229 was spent on the improvements; the liquida-
tion value was established at between $78,ooo and $8o,ooo.
8.o6 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Va. 1962).
'31 U-S.C. § 191 (1958).
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"FEDERAL COMMON LAW"
In an opinion that only indirectly indicated the basis of federal
jurisdiction, the District Court relied primarily on Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States.10 Since the United States was a party to the pro-
ceeding,11 holding a deed of trust lien, the District Court reasoned that
it was obliged to look beyond the Virginia statutes for a rule of law
more compatible with the national interest. With the fetters of local
real estate law thus cast aside, the logical inquiry was: What is the
"Federal Law?"'
2
In 1827 Chief Justice Marshall declared, in the case of Rankin v.
Scott, that "a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to prior
satisfaction, out of the subject it binds.... ."13 Although Rankin v. Scott
involved a dispute between private citizens, the case has been widely
cited for the proposition that the federal law relating to federal prior-
ity is that "the first in time is the first in right."' 4 Such was the conclu-
sion of the District Court in the Foodco case. The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, however, noted that this federal common law principle is prop-
erly invoked only "in the absence of a statute to the contrary,"' 5 and
went on to base its arrival at substantially the same result, on what is
known as the Federal Priority Statute.
THm FEDERAL PRioiTY STATUTE
Since 179916 there has been in effect what is popularly known as
the Federal Priority Statute.'7 This enactment, widely cited and widely
applied in bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings, but little reckoned
with at the local level, provides:
"Whenever any person indebted to the United States is in-
solvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the
hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay
all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United
States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall
extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient
10318 U.S. 56S (1943).
"See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 1441 (1958); United States v. Bond, io8 F.2d 504 (ioth
Cir. 1939), aff'g, Bond v. Tom 25 F. Supp. 157 (D. Okla. 1938).
1"oo6 F. Supp. at 885.
125 U.S. (12 Wheat) 177 (1827).
2AE.g., United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
5318 F.2d at 889.
"Act. of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 2o, § 5, 1 Stat. 515.
"Or unpopularly, depending upon which cause one espouses. 31 U.S.C. § 191
(1958).
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property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment
bhereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding,
concealed, or absent debtor or attached by process of law,
as ,to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
The wording is so broad that, viewed without reference to the
cases which construe it, the statute would apparently extend to any
case in which -the United States is a creditor and in which the debt-
or's estate is insufficient to pay all debts.' 8 But certain express or
implied limitations have been read into the statute.
In the first place, the state of insolvency which renders the statute
operative must not consist of "mere inability of the debtor to pay
all his debts....,19 The insolvency must be manifested by some "no-
torious act"20 by -the debtor, such as a voluntary assignment for the
benefit of creditors, an attachment, or an act of bankruptcy.
In the second place, there is abundant dicta to the effect that the
statute will not operate to divest a private lien which is specific and
perfected.2 ' Although the Supreme Court has never squarely so ruled,
22
there is a sufficient abundance of judicial consideration of the subject
to make it at least conceivable that a private lien, specific and per-
feoted according to state law, may yet prevail over a federal claim. As-
suming, as private creditors would like to do, that this is the case,
the next and most troublesome question is at what stage a given lien
becomes "specific and perfected," and in particular whether a mechan-
ics' lien is capable of meeting the tests of specificity and perfection
which have been laid down by the courts.
With regard to specificity, the Virginia statute23 requires the pros-
pective lienor to record a memorandum under oath specifying: (i)
the name of the owner of the property sought to be charged; (2) the
name of the claimant; (3) the amount and consideration of his claim;
(4) when the same is or will be payable; (5) a statement that he intends
I8The statute has been given broad effect by most decisions. See, e.g., United
States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Gilbert Associates,
345 U.S. 361 ('953); United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353
('945); United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
"9Conard v. Atlantic Co., 25 U.S. (I Pet.) 386 (1828).
"Prince v. Bartlett, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 431 ('914); United States v. Press Wire-
less, 187 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1951); Nolte v. Hudson Nay. Co., 8 F.2d 859 (2d Cir.
1925).
"United States v. Fidelity & Dep. Co. of Md., 214 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Atlantic Mun. Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v.
Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 2o F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1953).
"See United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. at 365.
-3Va. Code Ann. § 43-4 (1950) •
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to claim the lien; and (6) a description of the property sought to be
charged. Subsequently, within six months, he must file a chancery suit
to enforce the lien,24 and with it he must file a statement of account
under oath, showing: (i) the amount and character of the labor and
materials furnished; (2) the prices charged; (3) the payments made;
(4) the balance due; and (5) the time from which interest is claimed.
It is difficult to conceive how a mechanics' lienor could be more
specific than by following the requirements of Virginia law. The real
obstacle placed in his path is the requirement that his lien be per-
fected. It is before this requirement that mechanics' liens invariably
fall.25 The applicable federal decisions intimate that in order for a
mechanics' lien to be sufficiently specific and perfected to displace a
federal claim, if indeed such a result is possible, it must be actually
reduced to judgment in the foreclosure suit. As a practical matter, of
course, if the suit has progressed to conclusion, the question is moot,
at least as regards the mechanics' lienor. Moreover, at least one Su-
preme Court decision has held that the test is not met even where the
foreclosure suit is concluded and the real estate is owned by a remote
grantee.
This case, probably the most significant one illustrating the dilem-
ma of the mechanics' lien, is United States v. White Bear Brewing
Co.,26 which involved the following chronological events: (i) a mechan-
ic's lien was recorded for a specific amount encumbering real estate; (2)
suit was instituted to enforce the lien; (3) federal taxes were assessed
against the landowner; (4) the liens for these taxes were recorded; (5)
the mechanic's lien was reduced to judgment; (6) the real estate was
sold by order of court; (7) a deed was executed to a third party purchas-
er, who subsequently conveyed the real estate to another party; and (8)
sixteen months later the United States instituted a suit seeking to sub-
ject the real estate to its tax liens. The District Court and Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals both held that the tax liens were subor-
dinated to the mechanic's lien, and that the existing owner held the
realty free and clear of the tax liens. The United States Supreme Court
reversed without opinion.27 There being no opinion, one can only
surmise as to the Court's rationale. The United States was not "first in
2nVa. Code Ann. § 43-22 (1950).
3As a matter of fact, no case has been found which squarely holds that me-
chanics' liens are entitled to priority over a lien of the United States.
m'350 U.S. 1010 (1956).
n'The facts of this case are gleaned from the opinion of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, 227 F.2d 359, and the vigorous dissenting opinion of Justices
Douglas and Harlan, 350 U.S. 1010.
1964]
242 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI
time," and the mechanic's lien had been properly prosecuted to con-
clusion.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided three other cases
which reach substantially the same result as that in the White Bear
case; 28 it is interesting to note that each of these cases, like White Bear,
consists of a per curiam judgment of reversal, without opinion.
Along with its counterpart, the White Bear case has been widely
cited as authority in various decisions which uphold federal priority
as against various private liens. The case leaves little doubt that the
mechanic's lien occupies an extremely precarious position; indeed, the
courts have imposed such stringent tests that its subordination to fed-
eral tax claims is practically certain, regardless of relative chronol-
ogy.
2 9
The federal supremacy so clearly established as to tax liens was
extended by the Foodco case to a federal lien acquired in the course
of governmental participation in private business. The troublesome
policy implications are more clearly delineated here; the government,
which has gone into competition with private lenders, is allowed on
the one hand to claim the benefit of local laws to establish its deed
of trust lien,30 and on the other hand to repudiate other local laws
to effect its priority.
But the Supreme Court has apparently recognized no distinction
between the government's position where it levies taxes and where
it lends money. In Small Business Administration v. McClellan3' it was
held (i) that the Small Business Administration is " 'an integral part
of the governmental mechanism' created to accomplish what Con-
gress deemed to be of national importance;" it was further held (2)
that on insolvency the Small Business Administration is entitled to
full governmental priority under the Federal Priority Statute, even
nUnited States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66 (1958); United States v. Vorreiter, 355
U.S. 15 (1957); United States v. Colatta, 350 U.S. 8M8 (1955).
-"If anything is dearly discernible from the broad view of the federal priority
picture, it must be that private security interests have been denuded of the pro-
tection bargained for or statutorily prescribed. The government as a creditor has
acquired a supremacy almost impossible to characterize." Tofel, Federal Priority:
First in Time Is Not First in Right, 7 N.Y.L.F. 38o, 392 (1961).
8The Virginia deed of trust as a security device is entirely a creature of
statute. By its use in compliance with Virginia law, the creditor avails himself of
a lien which is flexible, and yet which guarantees the debtor reasonable protection.
An equivalent lien created without resort to Virginia statutes results in a common
law mortgage, cumbersome to use and difficult and expensive to foreclose.
n354 U.S. 446 (196o).
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though it had agreed to share any funds collected with the local bank
with which it participated on the loan.
3 2
There are many who feel that the result reached in these cases
is inequitable;3 3 that there is created a perpetual uncertainty which
raises unanswerable questions regarding the title to real estate; and
that as a matter of fundamental fairness, the artisans who extend their
credit to add value to the government's security should be able ef-
fectively to avail themselves of the only lien which the law affords
them.3 4 The solution is by no means clear; there are, however, two
approaches to a solution which may merit consideration.
SUSTAIN SPECIFIC AND PERFECTED LIENS
In spite of several lower court decisions35 suggesting that the strong
wording of the Federal Priority Statute is tempered somewhat where
competing private liens are both specific and perfected, it should
be emphasized that the United States Supreme Court has never
squarely so held. The lengths to which the Court has gone to sustain
federal priority would almost suggest that such speculation is un-
warranted, and that irrespective of state law, time sequence, specific-
ity, "choateness" or any of the various rationales which have been sup-
erimposed by the court, the Statute means just what it says: "the
debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied."
The judicial exemption of private liens which are specific and per-
fected, indulged in by some decisions, is justified on equitable prin-
ciples (and it is in courts of equity that these cases of foreclosure and
liquidation most often arise). So it would seem fitting for the Congress
to amend the Federal Priority Statute to exempt specific and perfected
-The Court followed its prior decision in United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423
(1941). Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in the Emory case reflects a point of view which,
though still extant, has been rejected time and again by the Supreme Court, to-
wit: that "government aid to a debtor may be a snare for his other creditors" no
less deserving of governmental consideration. 314 U.S. at 438.
mSee, e.g., the dissent of Haynsworth, J., in United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d
837, 849 (4th Cir. 196o): "When the tax lien seizes property, the real value of
which has been largely enhanced by lienor's labor and materials, it appropriates
values which the mechanic had created and which are his, in an economic sense,
until he is compensated and his lien or right to lien is discharged. The seizure of
such value seems an unjust enrichment of the United States at the expense of the
mechanic, not that of the taxpayer."
"The Supreme Court of yesteryear took this view, and in giving effect to local
mechanic's lien laws stated: "And this is just. Why should a purchaser or lender
have the benefit of the labor and materials which go into the property and give
it its existence and value?" Davis v. Bilsland, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 659 (1874).
'See note 21 supra.
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private liens from its operation. The prospect, however, of this sub-
stantial amendment to a statute which has been in effect since the
eighteenth century, is visionary indeed. Even so, the plight of the
mechanic's lien would not necessarily be alleviated even by this ac-
tion. According to the decisions, the mechanic's lien is endowed with
virtually no specificity and is incapable of perfection; 3 it is perpet-
ually inchoate. So whatever benefit might enure to other private
lienors by such an amendment, the mechanic's lien would remain
in a precarious position.
APPLY STATE LAW IN ADJUDICATING REAL PROPERTY LIENS
It is not amiss to point out that the several states, whatever their
derelictions in other regards, have a legitimate and paramount in-
terest in matters relating to the title to real estate within their re-
spective boundaries. Sale, purchase and security transactions involving
real estate are conducted, generally speaking, in reliance upon the ap-
plicable state laws governing deeds, mortgages, recordation, priorities
and related matters.
The sanctity of local real estate usage conflicts rather spectacular-
ly with the federal interests in a case such as Foodco. The question,
then, is whether the uniformity called for by the Clearfield Trust
case is of paramount importance to the point of supplanting local law;
or whether the United States, insofar as it participates at the market
place, is committed to the law merchant.37
Uniformity, it must be conceded, is not a fetish to be followed
blindly. Congress has seen fit on many occasions to deem state law
applicable to matters arising within the purview of a broad congres-
sional enactment. For instance, the Social Security Act compels refer-
ence to state law in determining the family relationships incident to
old age and insurance benefits. 38 The Small Business Act subordin-
ates the United States to the liens of state and local taxes, as estab-
lished by state law.3 9 It is not inconceivable, then, to suppose that the
'Mechanics' and similar liens are regarded as no more than "a caveat of a
more perfect lien to come;" virtual possession of the encumbered property is re-
quired. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
7It was pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in United States v. National Ex-
change Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1925) that "The United States does business on
business terms ... " and "is not excepted from the general rule by the largeness of
its dealings and its having to employ agents to do what if done by a principal in
person would leave no room for doubt."
'942 U.S.C. § 4 16(h)(i).
D15 U.S.C. § 646.
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United States might be required, where it encumbers real estate in-
cident to a credit transaction, to recognize and comply with local
lien laws. With such an end in view, the various federal enabling
acts, or the Federal Priority Statute itself, might be amended. Until
some effective action is taken, the mechanic's lien will continue to
occupy its unenviable position when opposed by federal claims.
CONCLUSION
Federal financing, particularly of the type afforded by the Small
Business Administration, is most often extended where comparable
financing is unavailable from local sources. In many cases, local lend-
ers, who are closely familiar with an applicant's situation, refuse to
underwrite a venture which they deem speculative, only to find that
the applicant subsequently acquires federal financing. Then, when
the inevitable collapse occurs, the United States successfully asserts
its priority, and quite often local laborers and materialmen, who have
contributed to the property its essence, are left without an effective
remedy. Thus is laid, in the words of Mr. Justice Reed,40 "a snare"
for private creditors.
Under Virginia law, a properly perfected mechanic's lien, to the
extent of the improvements made to real estate, is well nigh in-
vulnerable. However, its total vulnerability to federal liens, regardless
of when or under what circumstances the latter may arise, should give
pause to contractors, suppliers and laborers, and to the attorneys who
advise them. The tests laid down by the United States Supreme Court
divest the mechanic's lien of its intended status and render the
question of lien priorities forever contingent upon federal participa-
tion; it is even arguable that senior lien interests vested under state
law might be totally divested by the assignment of a junior lien to
the United States.
The sine qua non of effective real estate development is that build-
ers and suppliers be ready and willing to launch construction with
some assurance of being paid. The intricacies of high finance and the
law of real property do not and should not trouble the artisan who,
by his labors, adds to the land that which neither contract nor court
construction can take away.
'0See note 32 supra.
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